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INTRODUCTION
Like many commercial law professors, I have long been fascinated
with the workings of the Uniform Commercial Code's section 2-207,
the "battle of the forms" provision. There are two features of that sec
tion, one internal and one external, that make it such an intriguing
statute to ponder. The internal source of fascination with section 2207 is that it provides a classic model for teaching students about the
intricacies of statutory construction. There is probably no other provi
sion within U.C.C. Article 2 that provides more confusion to law stu
dents and more challenge to the instructor than does section 2-207.
There is a little bit of everything in there: subsections that must be
reconciled, Official Comments that must be reckoned with, and even
an apparent drafter's error or two that turns what would already be a
difficult statute into a nearly incomprehensible one.1
As good a device as section 2-207 is for introducing students to dif
ficult statutory construction problems, I suspect that the more in
triguing aspect of the provision for law professors is the .strange kind
of contract that the section sanctions. In a sense, the classic battle-of
the-forms sale turns contract law on its head. This is a deal in which
the two parties recklessly, if not knowingly, consummate a sale of
goods without having settled on all of the terms. And while one could
argue that every contract is incomplete at some level, what distin
guishes the battle of the forms case is that these contracts are most of
ten incomplete at very fundamental levels. Left unsettled are issues
like warranties, remedies, and other matters that no one could pretend
were beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of formation.
A second distinction between the battle-of-the-forms situation and the
typical incomplete contract is that with the battle of the forms, each
side has specifically proposed something for the open term so that we
know exactly what both parties wanted for that term.
During the last few years, interest in section 2-207 has been espe
cially strong in light of the Article 2 revision efforts that are finally
1. The two apparent drafting errors are found in subsections (1) and (2) of section 2-207.
[that] operates as an ac
ceptance." U.C.C.§ 2-207(1) (1999). Since a confirmation implies the existence of the con
tract that is being confirmed, it seems odd that the confirmation could serve as the accep
tance. By definition, if there is a confirmation of a pre-existing contract, then there must
have already been an offer and an acceptance. In section 2-207(2), we are told what to do
with "additional terms" in an acceptance form. Id. at § 2-207(2). But Official Comment
Three to section 2-207 begins by stating: "Whether or not additional or different terms will
become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2)." Id. at§ 2-207
cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
In section 2-207(1), the statute refers to a "written confirmation

. • .
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coming to a head.2 Given nearly 40 years of experience with the cur
rent battle-of-the-forms provision, the Article 2 revision committee is
now in a position to try to fix whatever is broken with that section and
perhaps to usher in the new millennium with a kinder, gentler section
2-207. What has been largely missing, however, in the many writings
about how to improve section 2-207 is an attempt to study how it actu
ally operates in practice. Up until recently, there has been precious
little empirical work done in the sales law area generally,3 but par
ticularly so in the realm of the battle of the forms.4 Given that literally
dozens of articles have been written about section 2-207,5 it is striking
that virtually none of them endeavors to investigate, at even a cursory
level, how the provision plays out in the field.6

2. In May of 1999, the American Law Institute ("ALI") passed the revised version of
U.C.C. Article 2 that had been produced by a drafting committee headed by Reporters
Richard Speidel and Linda Rusch. In July of 1999, however, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") decided to postpone voting on the
draft approved by ALI for fear that not all states would choose to adopt it. Professors
Speidel and Rusch both resigned their positions as a result of NCCUSL's decision to delay.
See emails from Christopher Hoving to UCCLAW-L listserv (July 26 and 27, 1999) (on file
with author). A newly constituted drafting committee chaired by Professor William
Henning has produced a new draft revision of Article 2 that was released in November of
1999.
3. For some notable exceptions, see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996);
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 {1992); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Re
lations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 {1963); Russell J, Weintraub,
A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1; James J, White, Contract Law
in Modern Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22
WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1982).
4. But see Electronic Messaging Servs. Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic
Data Interchange - A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645
{1990); Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use
of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 45 {1975).
5. A nonexhaustive sampling of the articles that have appeared during the last five years
includes: Alex Devience, Jr., The Renewed Search for the "Bargain in Fact" Under the UCC
Section 2-207: Battle ofthe Forms, Part II?, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 349 {1997); Victor P. Gold
berg, The "Battle of the Forms": Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV.
155 {1997); Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 {1997); Alexander M. Meikle
john, Castles in the Air: Blanket Assent and the Revision of Article 2, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 599 {1994); Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Redrafting U.C.C. Section 2-207: An
Economic Prescription for the Battle ofthe Forms, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 403 {1996); Mark E.
Roszkowski & John D. Wladis, Revised U.C.C. Section 2-207: Analysis and Recommenda
tions, 49 Bus. LAW. 1065 {1994); Nicholas R. Weiskopf, The Last Hurdle in the Ongoing Re
vision ofSection 2-207 of the UCC: Defining What Constitutes Assent to Varying Terms, 30
UCC LJ. 423 {1998); Phillip A White, A Few Comments About the Proposed Revisions to
UCC Section 2-207: The Battle ofthe Forms Taken to the Limit ofReason, 103 COM. L.J. 471
{1998).
6. The article by Professor Meiklejohn is something of an exception to this trend. While
Meiklejohn does not attempt to conduct his own empirical study, he does focus on what little
empirical evidence there is on the issue. Given the absence of any empirical evidence about
the existence of a "blanket assent" practice, he concludes that the drafters of revised Article
2 should simply get rid of section 2-207 altogether and let U.C.C.§ 2-204 handle the issue of
nonmatching terms in a battle of the forms. See Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 606-07.
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The purpose of this Article is to report on a modest study that I
undertook of how the battle-of-the-forms provision affects commercial
behavior. In conducting these twenty-five recorded telephone inter
views with representatives of companies that buy and sell goods, my
purposes were threefold: first, to test the validity of several factual as
sumptions that underlie most of the scholarship in this area; second, to
try to get a better sense of what reforms, if any, ought to be made to
section 2-207; and third, to determine what effects, if any, the increas
ing use of technology in sales contract formation has had on the battle
of the forms.
My series of interviews suggested a number of results that were
surprising, at least to someone like myself whose knowledge of section
2-207 has been mainly schooled by the conventional wisdom contained
in most law review articles on this subject. First, and perhaps most
fundamentally, the classic battle-of-the-forms situation7 seems to be,
for a variety of reasons, much less prevalent than one would guess
from reading most academic literature in this area. Second, without
any legal incentives to do so, some companies have shifted to drafting
less one-sided forms, at least as to issues that are not seen as critical to
their side's interests. Third, even where a battle of the forms occurs, a
number of parties will actually read the terms on the other side's
forms in certain fairly well-defined instances. Finally, technological
advances in contract formation appear to be having less impact in re
ducing the significance of section 2-207 than are certain market shifts
that have led to the formation of various mega-retailers who can
pretty much set the rules for any of their purchase orders.
In terms of reform ideas, these interviews left me with the sense
that probably all that is needed is a fairly modest simplification of sec
tion 2-207 along the lines of what the Article 2 revision process seems
likely to yield anyway at this point.8 I did, however, solicit reactions
from many of my subjects regarding two of the more creative and
radical section 2-207 reform ideas that were proposed by academics.9
While both of those proposals found some support among the inter
viewees, the apparent consensus of those in the trenches is for a sec-

7. When I refer to "the battle-of-the-forms situation" or "engaging in the battle of
forms," I don't mean to imply the existence of a dispute, but merely that forms were ex
changed that had nonmatching terms.
8. In the November 1999 "Reporter's Interim Draft for Co=ent" of revised Article 2,
the proposed section 2-207 is a simpler, more streamlined version of what we currently have.
For a fuller description of the revised version of section 2-207, see infra Part V. Copies of
the "Reporter's Interim Draft" may be obtained from this author, or from The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 211 E. Ontario Street, Suite 1300,
Chicago, Illinois 60611.
9. These two proposals are described in full in Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg,
Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV.
1217 (1982), and Goldberg, supra note 5. The proposals are described briefly in Part V, in
fra.
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tion 2-207 with fewer loopholes and a more immediate reliance on the
U.C.C. gap-fillers to resolve any issues for which the two sides' forms
have conflicting terms.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I considers the state of cur
rent section 2-207 law that governs the battle-of-the-forms cases. Part
II focuses on what commentators perceive to be the key flaws in the
current section 2-207. Part III describes the methodology I used in
undertaking these interviews. Part IV reports my findings concerning
four central factual assumptions that have been made in most scholar
ship about the battle of the forms. Part V reports the reactions of in
terview subjects to a few specific reform proposals for section 2-207.
Part VI explores the effects that technology and certain nontechnol
ogy factors are likely to have on the future of the battle of the forms.
I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS

If you think of the battle of the forms as a game, it is much more
analogous to tic-tac-toe than it is to chess. Just like in the game tic
tac-toe, it is difficult for either side to win the battle of the forms with
clever drafting, at least if we define "winning" as making the other
side be held to your nondickered terms. By the same token, it is easy
with good drafting never to lose the battle of the forms, at least if
"losing" equals letting your side get stuck with the other party's
boilerplate terms.
In order to appreciate how section 2-207 currently operates, one
must first understand both the business situation that it was designed
to address and the common law approach to the problem that section
2-207 was intended to replace. Suppose that a buyer and a seller sit
down and negotiate a contract for the sale of a sophisticated machine.
If the two parties put all of the terms of their contract in writing and
both sign a single document embodying those terms, section 2-207 will
have nothing to say about the situation. There would be no issue in
that case about whether and when the contract was formed - since
both sides signed a written contract - and there would be no question
about terms, since the contract covers all of the key terms (or at least
those that the parties could think of in advance of the sale).
Now suppose instead that these same two parties involved in the
sale of a machine did not sit down and sign a negotiated contract with
terms and conditions. Instead the buyer simply sent a purchase order
to the seller that contained the model, price, and the needed delivery
date of the machine on the front, with nonimmediate terms such as
warranties and remedies in boilerplate on the back. The seller, in
tum, responded to the buyer's purchase order with an acknowledg
ment form that reiterated the buyer's performance terms on the front
but contained completely different nonimmediate terms in boilerplate
on the back. Neither party read the back of the other party's form,
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though both parties did confirm the specifics of the front. The seller
then shipped the goods and the buyer paid for them. Later the ma
chine malfunctioned and caused significant damage to the buyer's
business, damages that were indeed well beyond what the machine
cost the buyer.
In this latter case, we are faced with questions both about forma
tion - whether and when - and about whose nonimmediate terms
will control. On the formation question, almost anyone would agree
that there was a valid contract at some point. After all, the buyer and
seller acted as if there were a contract by, at a minimum, shipping and
paying for the machine, respectively. The "when" of formation is
trickier, though: should formation be found to have occurred at the
time the seller sent its acknowledgment form to the buyer, or not until
each party performed some act that indicated its belief that there was
a sales contract?
The "terms" question is messier still. Buyer's and seller's forms
simply do not agree on the issue of warranties and remedies; there was
clearly no "meeting of the minds" there. Should we go with buyer's
terms, since buyer made the offer and offerors are said to be the mas
ters of their own offers? Should we go with seller's terms, since seller
sent the second form of the two forms involved and thus perhaps be
lieved that buyer was impliedly assenting to the changes that were
contained in seller's form? Or should we enforce neither the buyer's
nor the seller's terms, but instead some terms gleaned from a third
party source?
The dilemma that the law must face with this classic battle-of-the
forms scenario, as Professors Douglas Baird and Robert Weisberg
have pointed out, is that on the one hand, there is simply no way that
these questions can be answered with reference to the two parties'
"bargain in fact" - they simply did not have one as to these nonim
mediate terms.10 On the other hand, the law has to pick something on
the issue of which warranties and which remedies will govern: either
the buyer's terms, the seller's, or someone else's. The law just cannot
punt on this one.
Prior to the enactment of the U.C.C., the common law followed
what became known as the "mirror image" and "last shot" doctrines,
the former governing formation and the latter dictating terms.11 What
the mirror-image rule says is that when an offer is made, a purported
acceptance whose terms are not the "mirror image" of the offer will
not count as an acceptance but instead will be treated as a counter
offer. Thus, in the above example, the seller's acknowledgment form
would not serve as an acceptance to the buyer's offer to purchase the

10.

Baird & Weisberg, supra

note 9, at 1219-20.

11. See DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 48 (1998).
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machine since the nonimmediate terms on the two forms were not the
mirror images of each other. The seller's acknowledgment form
would serve instead as a counteroffer, and the buyer's act of paying for
the goods would count as an acceptance of the seller's counteroffer.
This is where the "last shot" doctrine comes into play. Because a
purported acceptance such as the seller's is treated as a counteroffer
that is then accepted by the buyer's performance, the seller's terms
will govern by virtue of its having fired the "last shot." Thus, under
the common law approach, the contract would be formed upon the
buyer's payment, and the seller would get the benefit of its presuma
bly more limited warranties and remedies when the machine malfunc
tioned in the buyer's hands.
The common law approach clearly had its critics. A typical com
plaint about the mirror-image rule, for example, is that it would allow
a party to renege on what was likely intended to be a binding deal, as
long as the party did so prior to any performance on its part.12 As Pro
fessors Baird and Weisberg point out, this criticism was probably
overplayed:13 first, this wasn't likely to be a significant risk in practice,
since most of the problems with exchange-of-forms deals came after
the goods had been delivered and something went wrong with the
goods; and second, in the rare case of a party seeking to renege on a
forms contract prior to its performance, courts could and arguably did
stretch the mirror-image doctrine to find that there was indeed agree
ment between the forms if they sensed an opportunistic breacher.
A separate source of complaint about the common law approach
was the arbitrariness and the all-or-nothing nature of the last-shot doc
trine.14 Why, after all, should one party's boilerplate terms control in
their entirety by the relative happenstance of that party's having sent
the last form in the exchange? Given that there was never a bargain
in-fact on those terms in the first place, it seemed unfair to these critics
to adopt a winner-take-all approach rather than to require some kind
of compromise.
The enactment of section 2-207 of the U.C.C. responded to both of
these concerns. On the formation issue, section 2-207(1) makes it
clear that the mere existence of additional or different terms in a
writing that otherwise purports to be an acceptance will not prevent
that writing from operating as an acceptance.15 Thus, subsection (1) of
section 2-207 marked the end to the common law's mirror-image rule.

12 See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 1223 ("Commentators assume that the
mirror-image rule cannot resolve the problem of the welsher satisfactorily.").
13. See id. at 1233-37.
14. See id. at 1232 (referring to the rule's "principal vice: arbitrary and fonnalistic deci
sions").
15. The precise text of section 2-207(1) is as follows: "A definite and seasonable expres
sion of acceptance or a written confinnation which is sent within a reasonable time operates
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Even under section 2-207(1), however, not every purported accep
tance with nonmatching terms will count as a valid acceptance. First,
the acceptance must still qualify as a "definite and seasonable expres
sion of acceptance" according to the language of the statute. Thus, for
example, the acceptance still must be sent within a reasonable time
following the offer. Further, there must be some point at which the
terms in the purported acceptance so diverge from the terms of the of
fer that you do not really have an acceptance at all.16 If the buyer of
fers to buy apples and the seller accepts the buyer's offer for the seller
to sell oranges, the seller's "acceptance" should not create a contract.
An acceptance to sell oranges is not a "definite and seasonable expres
sion of acceptance" to the buyer's offer to buy apples.
The second way in which a purported acceptance with nonmatch
ing terms will not operate as an acceptance is if the offeree uses the
magic language of section 2-207(1) and makes it clear that its accep
tance of the offer "is expressly made conditional on [the offeror's] as
sent to the additional or different terms [contained in the accep
tance]." When that language or something very close to it is used,
then there is no contract formation until the offeror gives its specific
assent to the offeree's additional or different terms. Performance
alone by the offeror should not count as such assent to the new terms,
or else we are simply back to the last-shot doctrine.
Whereas section 2-207(1) more or less reverses the mirror-image
rule of the common law, section 2-207(2) changes the last-shot doc
trine. If a contract is formed by the exchange of writings under section
2-207(1), then section 2-207(2) tells us what the contract's terms are.
Between merchants, any additional terms in the acceptance document
will become part of the contract unless those terms materially alter the
offer, or unless the offeror has specifically indicated either in its offer
or after receiving the acceptance that the offer is limited to its terms.
When the acceptance includes different rather than additional terms
and the contract is between merchants, most courts follow the knock
out rule, which ignores the conflicting terms and looks instead to the
U.C.C. gap-fillers for those terms.17
Section 2-207(3), the last subsection of section 2-207, covers the
case in which the parties exchange forms but the forms themselves do
not make a contract, either because the terms are too divergent or beas an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or
agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms." U.C.C. § 2-207 ( 1).
·

16. In order for the purported acceptance to be valid as such, Professors White and
Summ ers would require at a minimum that the acceptance is in agreement with the offer "as
to price, quality, quantity, [and] delivery terms." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§§ 1-3, at 33 {5th ed. 2000).
17. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 ( 10th Cir. 1984) ( applying
the "knockout rule").
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cause the acceptance was expressly made conditional on the offeror's
assent to the different or additional terms and no assent was forth
coming. In that case, if the two sides proceed to perform anyway, then
the conduct of the two parties serves to establish the existence of the
contract. The terms that govern such a conduct-formed contract are
"those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
[the U.C.C. gap-fillers]."18
When section 2-207 was first enacted nearly forty years ago, any
commercial lawyer who stepped back for a minute and assessed the
practical impact of the new section vis-a-vis the common law would
quickly come to a number of conclusions. First, whether you repre
sent the offeror or the offeree, you can (and arguably should) include
magic language in your form that will greatly limit the likelihood that
you will get stuck with the other side's boilerplate terms. If you are
the offeror, you can specifically limit the terms of your offer to the
terms that are included therein, and while you are at it, you can object
in advance to any additional or different terms that the offeree might
include in its purported acceptance of your offer. If you are the of
feree, you can mimic the language of section 2-207(1) and expressly
condition your acceptance on the offeror's assent to any additional or
different terms that you have included in your acceptance.
By using the magic language, you put yourself in a position where
the worst place you can end up regarding the boilerplate terms, should
you choose to perform, is with the U.C.C. gap-fillers. But that brings
you to your second conclusion: this whole new approach, compared to
the common law, raises the stakes on the U.C.C. gap-fillers, so you
had better know what they are in order to determine whether you are
truly comfortable with them. If you represent buyers, this is probably
not a bad place to be since the U.C.C. gap-fillers include fairly broad
warranty and remedy provisions, including the implied warranty of
merchantability19 and generous consequential damages.20
The third practical conclusion that a thoughtful commercial lawyer
would reach about the U.C.C.'s approach to the battle of the forms is
that there is simply no way for either side to ensure victory in this
fight, at least if victory is defined as getting the other side to be bound
by your boilerplate terms rather than theirs. You can, of course, try to
ensure victory by refusing to perform your side of the contract until
the other side signs on to the terms in your form. At that point,
though, you would end up with a real negotiated contract and it would
no longer be a true battle of the forms.

18. u.c.c.§ 2-207(3).
19. See id. a!§ 2-314.
20. See id. at§ 2-715(2).
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If the third conclusion is the bad news - that there is no sure rec
ipe for success in this battle - then the fourth conclusion is the good
news: neither side is ultimately forced to play by the other side's
terms in this battle. In other words, both sides have the ability to opt
out of the rules of section 2-207 completely, either by insisting on a
fully negotiated contract signed by both sides, or by seller refusing to
ship the goods or by buyer refusing to pay for the goods. The bad
news about this good news, though, is that not playing the game has its
own costs. Perhaps this is a sale that you really want to make, albeit
not on the buyer's terms. Or perhaps you feel that it would be too ex
pensive, given the fairly small size of the deal or the limited risk in
volved, to sit down and negotiate about nonimmediate terms that are
unlikely to matter in the end anyway.
The last conclusion that our astute commercial lawyer would draw
after studying section 2-207 is that this is a section that leaves a lot of
uncertainty about a lot of things - things like whether an acceptance
really does count as "definite and seasonable," whether an additional
term in an acceptance is a "material alteration" of the offer's terms, or
what happens if the U.C.C. does not have a specific gap-filler for the
issue on which the terms conflict. Some commentators have assailed
the uncertainty of the current section 2-207 as one of its most unattrac
tive features.21
Most of the action in the reported cases concerning section 2-207
arises following performance by the two parties and concerns terms
rather than contract formation.22 When there is a fight about forma
tion in a reported case, it is typically only a precursor to a dispute over
terms. That is because the questions of when a contract was formed
and what are its terms are inextricably linked in section 2-207. If a
contract was formed by the exchange of writings under section 2207(1), then the terms are determined under section 2-207(2), which
may or may not call into play the U.C.C. gap-fillers. If, on the other
hand, there was no contract formed by the writings under section 2207(1) but the parties performed anyway, then the terms will neces
sarily be determined under section 2-207(3), which will always look to
the U.C.C. gap-fillers except when the two forms already agree on the
term in question.
II.

REFORMING SECTION 2-207

Of the many dozens of articles that have been written about the
battle-of-the-forms statute, the one thing that just about all of the
authors agree with is that section 2-207 could be improved. Beyond

21. See, e.g., Ostas & Darr, supra note 5, at 412-13.
22 See, e.g., Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997). See gen
erally WlilTE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 29-48.
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that point of agreement, commentators have offered a variety of vi
sions as to what the ideal battle-of-the-forms provision would look
like. Before delving into some of the specific proposals that have been
put forth, it would probably be worthwhile to consider the various
ways in which commercial law scholars believe that the current section
2-207 is broken. It seems to me that there are at least three common
themes that run through the laments about the state of section 2-207.

1.

The Current Section 2-207 Is Too Technical, Arbitrary, and
Uncertain in Its Outcomes

This complaint combines a number of related themes concerning
the general user unfriendliness of the current battle-of-the-forms stat
ute. One author in this area, Professor John Murray, observes that the
outcome of battle-of-the-forms contests should not come down to such
niceties as which form is the offer and which is the acceptance, par
ticularly since in his experience the parties involved never think of
their forms as "offers" and "acceptances" in any event.23 Another pair
of commentators opine that the last-shot doctrine of the common law
has essentially been replaced by an equally technical and arbitrary
"first-shot" doctrine under section 2-207.24 Along the same lines, Pro
fessor Sandy Meiklejohn points out that one fundamental flaw in the
existing section 2-207 is that it creates at least the possibility that one
party might get stuck with the other side's boilerplate terms despite
any actual or implied consent by the party that would be bound by the
other side's form.25
Beyond the arbitrary outcomes suggested above, there is the sepa
rate but related matter of uncertainty of outcome. If neither side
really knows how its respective rights are allocated in a battle of the
forms, that arguably increases transactions costs both at the front end
and at the back end in the event of litigation. Professors Daniel Ostas
and Frank Darr note how the current section 2-207's uncertainty of
outcome increases transaction costs at both stages: at the front end,
the uncertainty of outcome gives parties a perverse incentive to read
fine print on the other side's form that they might otherwise be able to
ignore if there were greater certainty about the battle-of-the-forms
outcome;26 on the back end, the uncertainty of how courts will come
out on a battle-of-the-forms case increases costs because it encourages
parties to litigate rather than to settle.27
23. John E. Murray, Jr., A Proposed Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J.L. & COM. 337, 351 (1986).

24. See Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note 5, at 1071.
25.

See Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 606-07.

26. See Ostas & Darr, supra note 5, at 412-13.
27. See id. at 414.
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The Default Terms to Which Section 2-207 Directs the Parties Are
Too Favorable to the Buyer and May Not Be Terms That Either
Side Would Have Chosen in an Arms-Length Bargain

This point is as much a complaint about the nature of the U.C.C.
gap-fillers in general as it is about section 2-207 in particular. Never
theless, the machinery of section 2-207 is clearly designed to send bat
tle-of-the-forms stalemates to "any supplementary terms incorporated
under any other provisions of this Act."28 Critics have at least two
problems with that outcome. The first is that the U.C.C. gap-fillers
give the purchaser an unfair advantage. The second is that the gap
fillers, while nice in the abstract, really do not work particularly well
for any given deal.
Fairly early in the Article 2 revision process, a practicing lawyer
wrote to members of the drafting committee that if they were going to
clear up the uncertainties in the current section 2-207 and thereby
push more cases directly to the gap-fillers, then they really ought to fix
the gap-fillers so that they did not favor the buyer so much.29 This
lawyer added that it was no answer to his criticism to say that the
seller could always refuse to sell if it truly required its own terms as to
things like warranties and remedies. The problem with that approach,
the lawyer said, is that it puts the burden on the seller to spend its
money to try to negotiate every deal away from what would end up
being the default terms.30
An even more fundamental concern with the default mechanism of
the current battle of the forms is not that it favors buyers, but rather
that it yields terms that may be in neither party's interest. Professors
Baird and Weisberg observe that with certain quality issues such as
warranties, the buyer rather than the seller may be the cheaper risk
avoider.31 If that is the case, then it is inefficient for the seller to pro
vide a broad warranty (at a higher cost to buyer) instead of simply
selling the product more cheaply with no warranty.32 Yet under the
current battle-of-the-forms regime, the U.C.C.'s gap-filler on warranty
provides broad implied warranties. This in turn encourages wasteful
negotiations between buyer and seller that are conducted solely to
bargain around an inefficient gap-filler.33
Professor Victor Goldberg provides another example of what he
believes to be a U.C.C. gap-filler that neither party would choose if

28. u.c.c.§ 2-207(3).
29. See Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note 5, at 1069.
30. See id.
31. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 1250-51.
32 See id.
33. See id.
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the parties had negotiated about it: the availability of consequential
damages.34 Professor Stewart Macaulay's empirical work lends some
support to this notion in that he found that industrial sellers did not
typically offer buyers consequential damages, at least not voluntarily.35
My own interviews also suggest a sense in both buyers and sellers that
unlimited consequential damages for a product that itself does not cost
the buyer that much is, in the absence of some clear fault on the
seller's part, somehow inappropriate.36 Indeed, "consequential dam
ages" was singled out as probably the single "boilerplate term" that
the companies in my study are the most likely to negotiate about.
3.

The Current Section 2-207 Encourages Parties to Draft
Completely One-Sided Forms

One commentator speculates that the reason sellers include one
sided terms in their forms is that under the existing section 2-207,
those sellers believe that their terms will (or at least may) ultimately
control.37 This author suggests that the battle-of-the-forms provision
ought to be revised to make it clear that in any case where the two
parties' terms disagree, the court will simply provide the U.C.C. gap
fillers.38 Similarly, Professor Goldberg writes that very few of the sec
tion 2-207 reform efforts and commentary have adequately focused on
how to shift the incentives of the parties to take into account the inter
ests of the other side when drafting their forms.39 One notable excep
tion to this oversight is the proposal by Professors Baird and Weis
berg; Professor Goldberg has different criticisms of that proposal.40

34. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 157.
35. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract
Teaching: Past, Present, and Future, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 805, 818.
36. See, e.g., Interview No. 4 (transcript at 4-5) (on file with author) (suggesting that as a
buyer, you would typically give up access to consequential damages fairly readily if the seller
bothered to object about them).
37. See Gregory M. Travalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and
Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-207, 33 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 327, 377
{1983).
38. See id.
39. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 156.

See id. at 164 (asking rhetorically that if Baird and Weisberg are correct in their the
ory that parties will make their forms more balanced from the start as a way to anticipate a
minority of objectors, then why, under the currently existing knockout rule, haven't a subset
of sellers policed the one-sidedness of buyers' forms and caused the buyers to make their
forms more mutually beneficial?).
40.
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III. METHODOLOGY

Although recently there have been a number of important studies
that focus on the sales practices of discrete industries,41 on the whole
there have been very few studies that touch on contract formation is
sues in general and on U.C.C. section 2-207 in particular. In perhaps
the most famous interview-based study of the sales system, Professor
Macaulay conducted a wide-ranging series of interviews with repre
sentatives from forty-three companies and six law firms nearly forty
years ago.42 Professor Macaulay's study highlighted the significance of
noncontractual relations in business and revealed that business people
are generally not driven much, if at all, by the legal implications of the
decisions that they make. Perhaps most relevant to contract forma
tion, Professor Macaulay found that written contracts are very rarely
enforced in practice and that parties are much more likely to resort to
nonlegal sanctions to deter would-be breachers.43
In a study conducted nearly three decades after Professor
Macaulay's landmark project, Professor Russell Weintraub had corpo
rate general counsel fill out a written survey concerning the law's ef
fect on contract practices.44 Professor Weintraub reiterated the con
clusions of Professor Macaulay's study concerning the primacy of
business over legal considerations in the day-to-day affairs of com
merce, but added a key caveat: "[T]he law should not be contrary to
practices that the community perceives as normal and desirable."45
Thus, Professor Weintraub discovered in his study that there is a sig
nificant difference between saying that the law does not control busi
ness practice and saying that the law has no effect on business practice.
His key point was that even though business behavior is driven on a
surface level by business rather than legal considerations, the law nev
ertheless plays a subtle and important role in the process.
Somewhat ironically, the most direct study on the battle of the
forms was conducted in a jurisdiction that still follows the common law
last-shot doctrine. In a 1975 article, British Professors Hugh Beale
and Tony Dugdale reported on a series of interviews they conducted
with representatives from 19 engineering manufacturers in England.46
The Beale and Dugdale article has been cited in some American law
41. The two articles by Professor Bernstein, supra note 3, for example, focus on the
practices of the grain industry and the diamond industry.
42 See Macaulay, supra note 3, at 55.
43. See id. at 61-62.
44.

See Weintraub, supra note 3.

45. Id. at5.
46. See Beale & Dugdale, supra note 4. England still uses the common law approach to
the battle of the forms. See Butler Mach. Tool Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (Eng.), [1979] 1
W.L.R. 401 (C.A. 1977).
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review articles on battle of the forms as suggesting that, contrary to
commonly accepted assumptions, at least some parties do read the
forms that the other side sends and do have some appreciation for
their legal signifi.cance.47
Finally, Professor Murray, who has probably written as much and
has been as influential as any academic in the section 2-207 debate, has
made reference in some of his work to having spoken with over 5000
purchasing agents over the course of a decade.48 Although there is not
a lot of detail in Professor Murray's writings concerning the nature
and scope of these conversations, he does report that he has never
found a single purchasing manager who actually read the terms on the
other side's form and that most purchasing managers could not even
explain what the terms meant on their own forms much less on the
other side's.49
My own study began with me reading every article I could find that
was published during the last twenty years that focused on section 2207 and the battle of the forms. As I read these articles, the two fea
tures that I was most interested in were: first, what factual assump
tions the various authors were making concerning the behavior of the
parties that were involved in the battle of the forms; and second, what
the authors believed was wrong with section 2-207 as it was currently
drafted. My aim was to come up with a list of questions that would
probe the factual assumptions being made by scholars in the area and
that would also attempt to discern whether the problems in section 2207 identified by scholars were also of concern to those in practice.
Based on this literature review, I came up with an initial series of
questions to ask subjects. I later refined this series of questions with
the help of two academics50 who have both done some empirical work
in commercial law.
In deciding which companies to approach and which individuals to
interview at each company, I had the benefit of having conducted a se
ries of thirteen interviews three years ago in preparation for writing a
sales casebook.51
Although my previous interviews had touched
briefly on section 2-207 questions, contract formation was just one of

47. See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 1254 n.87.
48. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1317-18 n.47 {1986) [hereinafter Murray, Chaos]; John E. Murray, Jr.,
The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67
CORNELLL. REV. 735, 778 n.207 {1982).
49. Murray, Chaos, supra note 48, at 1317 n.47.
50. The two professors who reviewed an earlier draft of the questions were Professors
James J. White and Ronald J. Mann from the University of Michigan Law School.
51. The results of those interviews are reported both in KEATING, supra note 11; and in
Daniel Keating, Measuring Sales Law Against Sales Practice: A Reality Check, 17 J.L. &
COM. 99 {1997).
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several issues that I had explored in conversations that were fairly
broad in their coverage of sales law but not particularly detailed in any
one area. In my interviews three years ago, I ended up speaking with
three categories of individuals: business people, in-house corporate
counsel, and outside counsel that represented companies. What I dis
covered from that small sample is that the most useful interviews
seemed to be with in-house counsel, who are perhaps in the best posi
tion to straddle the line between legal and business concerns. The
other advantage of interviewing in-house counsel with a battle-of-the
forms project is that in most companies large enough to have their
own lawyers, these lawyers almost invariably are the ones who draft
the forms and who oversee the exchange-of-forms operation.
While they clearly understand the law, in-house counsel seem also
to appreciate the inner workings of the company that employs them
and how, if at all, the law affects those workings. Business people
clearly bring a unique perspective to bear as well, but their answers of
ten lack the richness I found in the dual perspectives of the in-house
counsel. The problem with the outside counsel of a company is that,
except in unusual cases, they tend not to have their pulse on the way
things actually work inside the company that they represent.
I ended up with a sample of both large and small companies,
though more large than small, with the majority being large manufac
turers of goods with at least $1 billion in sales each year. These com
panies buy and sell a variety of different goods, including food prod
ucts, paint, cars, electronic equipment, medical supplies, and various
consumer goods. One reason that the sample was biased toward large
companies is that I suspected these companies would be more likely to
have thought about battle-of-the-forms problems if for no other rea
son than the sheer volume of sales that they conduct. St. Louis is the
most common location for the headquarters of the companies with
which I spoke, although the majority of the companies are not based
in St. Louis. Of the companies I interviewed, ten are both a purchaser
and a vendor in battle-of-the-forms contexts, eleven are exclusively or
primarily a purchaser, and four are exclusively or primarily a vendor.
Of the twenty-five companies I interviewed, seventeen were repre
sented in the interviews by in-house counsel that specialize in con
tracting practices, six were represented by business people who handle
sales contracts, and two by outside counsel.52 I actually interviewed

52. The way in which I identified a person to be interviewed was to find a contact at
some companies that I knew bought and/or sold goods. A few of these initial contacts were
acquaintances; others were alumni from the law school where I teach. I felt that it was im
portant that my initial contact people have some connection to me so that they would be
willing to take the time to locate for me the person within their company who dealt most
frequently with exchange-of-form sales contracts. Furthermore, I thought that my having a
connection to someone in the company would make it more likely that the interview subject
would ultimately agree to take the time to speak with me. Once I could identify the battle-
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thirty-two people, since at four of the companies I simultaneously in
terviewed two or more people by speaker phone. The smaller compa
nies tended to be represented in the interviews by business people,
since those companies generally did not even have in-house counsel.
The two outside counsel I spoke with were both in special circum
stances: one has long acted as a de facto in-house counsel for a
smaller company; the other represents an entire trade association of
credit managers who deal with battle-of-the-forms situations.
The interviews varied in length from about twenty to fifty minutes,
with the average being about thirty minutes.s3 Not all of the subjects
were in a position to answer all of my questions, and some of the ques
tions simply did not apply to certain of the respondents. For example,
at least some of the companies have gotten to the point where they
simply never engage, at least to their knowledge, in a battle of the
forms. For representatives of those companies, I could not ask my
otherwise standard question, "Why would you knowingly engage in
the battle of the forms rather than simply resolving all of the boiler
plate terms in advance?"
There are a number of ways that one might study how battle-of
the-forms law works in practice. First, one could do actual raw data
collection by studying the written records of companies54 or even their
behavior. Second, one could send out a written survey much like Pro
fessor Weintraub did in his study of general counsels' attitudes toward
the law's effect on business.ss The third approach, and the one chosen
here, is oral interviews. Like the other two approaches, the interview
approach has its advantages and disadvantages.
The greatest advantage that I find with the interview approach is
the ability to ask follow-up questions. Sometimes you discover with
certain subjects that you are simply asking the wrong question; with a
written survey, it is harder to pick up on that. In order to achieve this
advantage to the interview approach, however, you generally cannot
afford to delegate the task of interviewing to a research assistant. I

of-the-forms expert within a company, I would call that person, explain the purpose of my
study, and ask to arrange a later recorded phone interview with him or her.
Because the interviews were being recorded and because I wanted subjects to be as can
did as possible, I gave all of the interviewees the option of remaining anonymous for pur
poses of attribution. Most subjects chose to be anonymous, usually for fear that they might
unwittingly reveal company strategy or perhaps dirty laundry concerning how they conduct
their business. Some just did not want to go through whatever channels they would need to
in order to get their company to agree to be identified.
53. Full transcripts of all the interviews are available from the author (with identities
redacted where requested by the subject).
54. An excellent example of such raw data collection can be found in this symposium
issue with Ronald J. Mann's article, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions,
98 l\1ICH. L. REV. 2494 (2000).
55. See Weintraub, supra note 3.
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view the inability to delegate as an advantage of its own, in that the re
searcher is personally getting the flavor of each and every interview.
Another key advantage to the interview approach is that it is much
more manageable to conduct a study that is at least enlightening, if not
statistically significant. Because each interview can be so deep, you
can learn a fair amount without the need for hundreds or even dozens
of subjects.
The same features of the interview approach that are its strengths
can also be a source of drawbacks. Because the researcher is asking
follow-up questions, no two interviews are necessarily going to be the
same and it is hard to control for the subconscious (or conscious) bi
ases of the interviewer toward finding a certain conclusion. And be
cause each individual interview is time-consuming, you are less likely
to be dealing in sample sizes that will prove to be statistically signifi
cant. Thus, sample bias is more likely to loom large with the interview
approach because the number sampled will typically be small. Finally,
because of the free-ranging nature of the interview approach, it would
be more difficult to quantify data and run numbers even if you had a
larger sample size.
Given that there are literally thousands of companies in this coun
try that buy and sell goods, anything that I learned from speaking with
twenty-five such companies can, of course, only be suggestive. There
may well be confounding variables such as industry or geography or
company size that would be impossible for me to discern with such a
small sample size. Regarding sample bias, I will repeat here the la
ment first uttered by Stewart Macaulay concerning the difficulty of
trying to screen your sample selection in the absence of much existing
research in the area: "[T]o a great extent, existing knowledge has
been inadequate to permit more rigorous procedures - as yet one
cannot formulate many precise questions to be asked a systematically
selected sample of 'right people.' "56
IV.

TEsTING FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECTION

2-207

If one takes the time to read some of the voluminous literature
that exists concerning the battle of the forms, it quickly becomes clear
that most of the commentators are making certain factual assumptions
about the way section 2-207 plays out in practice. Some of these as
sumptions are specifically stated by the authors; others are implicit in
what the authors are writing. Below I list four very common assump
tions that I found in my reading of the literature, and in each case I
compare what I found in my interviews with the conventional wisdom.

56.

Macaulay, supra note 3, at 56.
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The Battle-of-the-Forms Provision Is a Significant Issue for
Companies That Buy and Sell Goods

This assumption is not stated in the literature as such, but it is nev
ertheless apparent in most of the articles on the subject if you read be
tween the lines. The sheer number of articles on section 2-207 alone
suggests that a lot of scholars view the battle of the forms as significant
enough to share their wisdom with the world. When the revision ef
forts began for Article 2 of the U.C.C., section 2-207 was at the top of
many critics' list as one of the provisions that were most in need of
significant reform.57
My first clue that section 2-207 wasn't nearly as important in prac
tice as I thought came when I began trying to set up the interviews for
this Article. Whenever I would contact the general counsel's office at
a company, my goal was always to find the one person in the depart
ment who had the most experience dealing with battle-of-the-forms
issues. What I quickly discovered was that even at the largest compa
nies - Fortune 50 companies, in some instances - the most expert
lawyer in that subject had precious little experience with section 2-207.
When I note here my surprise at the lack of prominence of section
2-207 in practice, I am not simply referring to a re-discovery of the
more generalized Macaulay-esque "law in action" reality that says no
particular statute or contract dramatically affects commercial behav
ior. Rather, I am referring to a more specific finding concerning the
significance of the battle of the forms in particular.
A. Contract Formation Practices That Eliminate the Battle
What I found is that nearly half of the twenty-five companies that I
interviewed were either never or virtually never in a position even to
engage in a battle of the forms at all, due to the nature of their con
tract formation practices. Of those companies that sometimes allow
themselves into a battle-of-the-forms scenario, virtually all of them
said that post-sale disputes that depended on conflicting forms were
extremely rare and that litigation on the subject was rarer still.58
When companies choose to opt out of the battle of the forms,
whether consciously or subconsciously, they do so in a variety of dif
ferent ways: 1) A couple of respondents indicated that the vendors in
57. In the May 1, 1999 Proposed Final Draft of revised Article 2 that was approved by
the American Law Institute, section 2-207 was one of eight parts of Article 2 that was identi·
fied by the drafters as having been the subject of "the most important changes in Revised
Article 2." Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2: Sales, reporter's memorandum at
xxiv (Proposed Final Draft May 1, 1999) (draft available upon request from the author).
58. One question that I did not ask my subjects that, in hindsight, I clearly should have
was how the frequency of battle-of-the-forms disputes compared with the frequency of other
sales contract disputes that were not related to the battle of the forms.
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their deals will virtually never send an acknowledgment form or, if
they do, it merely acknowledges that the sales agreement was reached
but does not include any terms beyond the ones that were already ne
gotiated;59 2) The Director of Purchasing for a medium-sized plastics
manufacturer indicated that he always negotiates all terms with the
seller prior to sending the purchase order and that the purchase order
includes those pre-negotiated terms;60 3) For some of the larger com
panies, practically the only sales that they will conduct are with long
term customers who agree in advance to sign a master agreement that
includes all terms and conditions that will govern any future orders;61
4) One large computer manufacturer requires that any purchaser must
sign in advance a form prepared by that manufacturer that outlines all
of the terms and conditions that will govern future purchases;62 5)
Some companies require that the credit application that a purchaser
must sign in order to be eligible for credit also include the purchaser's
assent in advance to all of the vendor's terms and conditions;63 6) A
couple of large retail purchasers send to any prospective vendor a
"vendor's handbook" that describes the purchaser's terms and condi
tions on which it will do business with the vendor, and the vendor
must agree to those terms before selling to the purchaser;64 and 7)
With some, though not most, Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI")
arrangements, the EDI Trading Partner Agreement, that both sides
sign at the front end of the relationship, will also include all terms and
conditions of future sales.65
B. Determining When a Fully Dickered Contract Is Warranted
Even companies that have not eliminated completely the possibil
ity of a battle of the forms nevertheless have to determine when a par
ticular sales contract is significant enough to warrant a fully dickered
contract signed by both sides. On this question, most companies in
terviewed did not have specific dollar-size or other well-defined pa
rameters by which to measure whether a certain deal was worth cre
ating its own fully negotiated contract. Because there were typically
59. See Interview No. 2 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); Interview No. 5 (transcript
at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 24 (transcript at 5) (on file with author).
60. See Interview No. 15 (transcript at 2-3) (on file with author).
61. See Interview No. 3 (transcript at 4-5) (on file with author); Interview No. 14 (transcript at 3-5) (on file with author); Interview No. 17 (transcript at7) (on file with author).
62. See Interview No. 23 (transcript at 4) (on file with author).
63. See Interview No. 16 (transcript at 2) (on file with author).
64. See Interview No. 20 (transcript at 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 25 (tran
script at 2-3) (on file with author).
65. See Interview No. 13 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); Interview No. 21 (tran
script at 3-4) (on file with author); Interview No. 22 (transcript at 4-5) (on file with author).
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no set thresholds, companies tended to take an ad hoc approach that
considered various factors that would weigh in favor of doing a truly
integrated contract: the overall size of the deal, the likelihood that a
particular buyer-seller relationship would end up being long term, the
reputation of the company on the other side, and any risk that was
perceived to be unusual. For example, one company would never al
low itself into a battle-of-the-forms scenario with a non-U.S. company,
because the U.C.C. might not apply to the transaction.66 Another
company indicated that any time the other side objected to boilerplate
language in its form, the company would simply negotiate a real con
tract rather than fight about the terms in one side's form.67
C.

Frequency ofPost-performance Disputes About Conflicting Terms

Even where companies enter into a battle of the forms, they rarely
find themselves in a position where the differences in the nonimmedi
ate terms matter. The most common reason suggested for the infre
quency of after-the-fact disputes about conflicting forms is that in
most cases the value of the relationship to both parties will exceed
whatever amount is in controversy.68 The Vice-President of Finance
for a medium-sized furniture manufacturer explained that his com
pany might see about three such disputes in a year.69 Even those few
disputes, he said, almost always get worked out, with a focus on
whether either side was at fault and what would be fair, and with an
eye toward continuing the business relationship if at all possible.70 The
in-house counsel for a major department store retailer gave this suc
cinct reason for why after-the-fact form disputes don't typically
amount to much: "We're more interested in being in the retail busi
ness . . . [than] in the litigation business of trying to collect money. "71
Respondents suggested two situations when a battle-of-the-forms
dispute might actually come to litigation. The first is when potentially
massive consequential damages are at stake that could prove more
significant than even the value of the ongoing relationship to each
party.72 The second is when the overall relationship between the

66. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 7) (on file with author). The U.N. Convention on
Contracts of the Sale of Goods ("CISG") uses a version of the last-shot and mirror-image
rules. CISG arts. 18-19, 19 I.S.M. 668, 675-76 (1980).
67. See Interview No. 3 (transcript at 4) (on file with author).
68. For a thorough treatment of the dynamics of settlement, see Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1 (1996).
69. See Interview No. 11 (transcript at 4) (on file with author).
70. See id.
71. Interview No. 25 (transcript at 6) (on file with author).
72 See Interview No. 19 (transcript at 5-6) (on file with author).
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buyer and the seller has somehow soured and one of the parties is just
looking to pick a fight. As the in-house counsel for a major office
products manufacturer put it, when the battle of the forms becomes a
litigable issue, it is usually a sign that the "dealO [has] just gone bad."73
A lawyer who works extensively with vendors' credit managers sug
gested that in some cases in which a purchaser cannot or will not pay a
debt for goods delivered, the purchaser will raise some type of battle
of-the-forms issue as a defense to payment.74

2.

When Companies Do Engage in the Battle of the Forms,
They Do So Because It Is Efficient

One question that an outsider to the battle of the forms might
rightly ask is, why would you knowingly perform a contract where you
haven't first agreed with the other side on all of the significant terms?
Most of the academic literature on section 2-207 seems to assume ei
ther explicitly or implicitly that the reason companies engage in a bat
tle of the forms is that it makes sense according to the following cost
benefit analysis: At least for some sales contracts, the costs of re
viewing and then negotiating about nonimmediate terms are simply
not worth the benefit, given the low likelihood of a future dispute
about these terms and the relatively low cost of losing such a dispute if
there is one.75
The overwhelming majority of company representatives with
whom I spoke would agree with the academics on this one. The in
house counsel for a major consumer appliance manufacturer justified
her company's engaging in the battle of the forms this way: "It's effi
ciency, and it's an ability to get business done."76 Several respondents

73. Interview No. 17 (transcript at 8) (on file with author).
74. See Interview No. 16 (transcript at 6) (on file with author).
75. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: Optimal
Institutional Design for Regulating Incomplete Contracts 16-17 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law,
Legal Studies Working Paper Series 1999), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?
abstractid+169276> (positing that one reason why contracting parties create incomplete con
tracts is that the cost of bargaining about all contingencies exceeds the benefits); Morris G.
Shanker, Are You Losing the Battle ofSales Forms?, 5 CORP. COUNS. Q. 36, 50-51 (1989)
(suggesting that lawyers should advise clients to decide which sales contracts are significant
enough that it is worth the time to sit down and work out the details, but the client needs to
decide which deals would be encompassed by such an approach); Robert M. Rosh, Note,
Demilitarizing the Battle ofthe Forms: A Peace Proposal, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 553,
562-563 (arguing that the battle of the forms may well be economically efficient, as corpora
tions seem to have concluded, given the relatively few number of disputes that arise later);
James J. White, Autistic Contracts, at 3-4 (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author) (contending that parties probably rationally conclude that sales contracts with less
than ideal terms are better than no contracts at all and are also better than ideal contracts
that include a high cost for negotiating, particularly since the number of contracts can be
large, the number of problem contracts can be small, and the size of each resultant problem
tends not to be huge).
76. Interview No. 10 (transcript at 12) (on file with author).
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emphasized that even if there was some sort of dispute later on, the
resolution of that dispute would end up depending more upon the
quality of the particular relationship than upon what either form said.
As the lawyer for a paper products manufacturer put it, "[A] couple of
golf games can get a lot solved. "77
In the efficiency equation that sometimes dictates a battle of the
forms, there are a number of costs that are saved by engaging in the
battle. First, there is the overall cost of people's time that it would
take to negotiate all of the nonimmediate terms of the contract.78 A
second time-related cost that is saved by the battle of the forms is the
cost of delay.79 Sometimes the circumstances will dictate that a par
ticular sale needs to be a rush order, and the back-and-forth of a full
negotiation would be virtually impossible to pull off in that setting.
A third cost avoided by engaging in a battle of the forms is perhaps
psychological. At the front end of a deal, why would a business person
want to raise such nasty prospects as future disputes over noncon
forming goods?80 Most young couples engaged to be married don't
choose to negotiate pre-nuptial agreements, yet the odds of a break
down there are a lot greater than the odds of a product going bad with
any particular sale. And while buyers and sellers aren't exactly "love
birds" like our hypothetical newlyweds, virtually all of the respondents
I spoke with emphasized at one point or another the vast importance
of a strong working relationship between the two sides in long-term
supply contracts.
Some of the in-house lawyers that were interviewed pointed to the
different perspectives of lawyers and business people as one reason
why nonmatching forms are sometimes allowed to serve as contracts.81
Whereas the lawyers tend to be more risk averse, the business people
who are on the front lines of these deals have very little reason to want
to compare nonimmediate terms on the forms and bring them to the
attention of the lawyers. Furthermore, there is the reality that these
business people are not generally reading the forms anyway.
A couple of the in-house lawyers whose companies are primarily
purchasers also mentioned that part of their comfort level with en
gaging in the battle of the forms stems from the generally favorable

77. Interview No. 6 (transcript at 12) (on file with author).
78. See Interview No. 4 (transcript at 7) (on file with author); Interview No. 11 (tran
script at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 12 (transcript at 6) (on file with author).
79. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); Interview No. 18 (tran
script at 4) (on file with author); Interview No. 22 (transcript at 8) (on file with author).
80. See Interview No. 12 (transcript at 6) (on file with author).
81. See Interview No. 6 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); Interview No. 7 (transcript
at 8-9) (on file with author); Interview No. 16 (transcript at 4) (on file with author).
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treatment that the U.C.C. gap-fillers accord to buyers.82 As discussed
above in Part I, although no party can assure that its terms will prevail
in the battle of the forms, it is fairly easy to draft your forms to assure
that you at least end up with the gap-fillers. For purchasers, that
means access to the broad implied warranties and to all available
remedies, including consequential damages.

3.

Parties Uniformly Draft Their Forms to Be as One-Sided
as Possible in Their Favor

This commonly held assumption in the literature certainly has an
intuitive appeal to it.83 After all, why not try to get all that you can for
your side on the boilerplate terms, particularly if the other side is not
paying that much attention to them anyway? Certainly this assump
tion did prove true for most of the companies that I interviewed. On
the other hand, this approach was far from universal, and there were a
few respondents who described their company's conscious effort to
draft their forms in a more balanced fashion from the start. In the
end, I could delineate three categories of approaches that companies
took to this issue: 1) draft the forms as one-sidedly as possible for the
company's benefit; 2) try to protect the company's interests on issues
that matter to the company, but don't needlessly overreach or include
terms that are oppressive to the other side; and 3) draft a form from
the start that is very balanced and reasonable and that your company
would be comfortable with if it were on the other side.
Those who took the first approach generally justified it on the
grounds that this was probably what the other side was going to do, so
it was as much a defensive move as anything else. As the in-house
lawyer for a consumer appliance manufacturer explained, her com
pany's purchase orders were not meant to be neutral in any sense be
cause the company wanted to make sure that it at least knocked out all
of the vendor's one-sided terms on their forms.84
Those companies espousing the second approach recognize the
need to protect their interests but also appreciate the potential cost of
being overbearing to the other side. The in-house counsel for a manu
facturer of office products claimed that his company's forms tended to

82 See Interview No. 13 (transcript at 7) (on file with author); Interview No. 25 (tran
script at 8) (on file with author).
83. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 162 n.27 (indicating that virtually everyone agrees
that the employees who deal with these forms don't take the time to read what's on them,
which gives both sides an incentive to make their forms as one-sided as possible);
Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 627 (reporting that in his reading of the extensive literature on
section 2-207 most of the models for reform assume that the parties use one-sided boiler
plate terms in their forms).
84. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 2) (on file with author).
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be more balanced and reasonable than most.85 The one instance
where his company takes a hard line on the forms, this lawyer said, is
where it is selling a smaller part that will be part of a larger product.
In that case, the company will insist on a limitation of liability that is
appropriate to the relatively small benefit that it is getting out of the
sale.86
A third approach is represented by three large companies that
claim their forms are unusually balanced from the start.87 Within this
category, a couple of respondents indicated that their companies had
recently undergone a major shift of policy on how to draft their forms.
The in-house counsel for an aircraft manufacturer explained how his
company had decided to shift from very one-sided terms in its form to
much more balanced and reasonable terms. The reason for the shift in
policy was efficiency, namely that the new approach saves the com
pany time "arguing over things that you are going to end up losing
anyway in negotiations."88 The in-house counsel for a computer
manufacturer described how a few years ago his company changed its
forms to those that are more balanced than they are one-sided, with
the goal that the forms be put in plain English that a ninth grader can
read. The same lawyer described how his company once ended up in a
deal in which its own form was used as a starting point for the other
side, and there were actually very few terms that he felt he needed to
change to protect his company.89
What is interesting about this final group of large companies is that
all three of them have a more or less take-it-or-leave-it approach to
their forms. Thus, the battle of the forms ends up being not very rele
vant to a company such as these three that has the leverage to insist on
the other side signing its form. More significantly, because a large
company like this suspects that the other side is likely to read the form
(given that it will be asked to sign it), there is perhaps a greater ten
dency to draft the form in a way that compromises on issues that are
nonessential to the drafter. Given the small number of companies in
this category, this finding is only suggestive but would be an interest
ing subject to focus on in a later study.

85. See lnterview No. 17 (transcript at 5) (on file with author).
86. See id.
87. See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 20 (tran·
script at 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 23 (transcript at 2) (on file with author). Cer·
tainly one could question the veracity of such self-serving statements concerning the "bal
ance" of one's own forms. On the other hand, as noted above in the text, most respondents
admitted that their forms were in fact fairly one-sided.
88. Interview No. 8 (transcript at 3) (on file with author).
89. See Interview No. 23 (transcript at 2) (on file with author).
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Nobody Reads the Forms

Perhaps a more precise way to articulate this very prevalent as
sumption in the section 2-207 literature is that nobody reads the
boilerplate or nonimmediate terms on the forms. While clearly there
is a lot of truth to this assumption, my interviews suggest that there are
at least some levels of nuance to the issue. Because the nonreading of
forms seems to be such a central and universal assumption in the lit
erature,90 I approached the issue in my interviews with three discrete
but related questions: 1) What proportion of your vendors or pur
chasers do you think actually read all or most of the boilerplate terms
on your form?; 2) How commonly does the other side object to a term
or terms in your form, and if they do, which terms are usually at is
sue?; and 3) When you receive the other side's form, to what extent
does someone in your company read the terms on the form?
About half of the respondents believed that the other side either
never or rarely read the forms that their companies sent to them. On
the other hand, about half of the company representatives indicated
their belief that at least some of the companies on the other side were
reading their forms, depending on a variety of factors. Several sub
jects indicated that the other side would read their form at least at the
outset if they were a new customer, and particularly if a long-term
supply relationship were contemplated.91 One respondent opined that
large companies are more likely to have someone reading the forms
than are small companies.92 Another company representative indi
cated a belief that in his dealings, more purchasers than vendors on
the other side react to his company's forms;93 conversely, a different
subject suggested that vendors are more likely than purchasers to read
her company's forms.94
Probably the surest indication that the other side is reading your
company's form is when they object to some term within it. The con
sensus on this question was that it rarely happens, and when it does, it
is much more likely to be with a large-dollar purchaser or a large-

90. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 627 (noting that an assumption of most reform
models for section 2-207 is that neither side's sales personnel read the forms as to boilerplate
terms); Murray, Chaos, supra note 48, at 1317-18 (reporting his experience with "more than
5,000 purchasing agents" that convinced him that these agents never read the forms of sell
ers); Travalio, supra note 37, at 375-76 (expressing doubt that buyers really either read or are
aware of the one-sided fine print on sellers' forms). But see Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9,
at 1251-52 (suggesting that at least some parties will read the forms).
91. See Interview No. 11 (transcript at 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 12 (tran
script at 3) (on file with author); Interview No. 17 (transcript at 6) (on file with author); In
terview No. 24 (transcript at 2) (on file with author).
92 See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 3) (on file with author).
93. See Interview No. 12 (transcript at 3-4) (on file with author).
94. See Interview No. 3 (transcript at 2) (on file with author).
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dollar vendor.95 When there is an objection to a term on a form, my
study suggests that the objection tends to focus on warranties or
remedies, especially consequential damages.96 At the point when an
objection is registered, the procedure at most companies with which I
spoke is for the business side and the legal side to work together to de
termine both the importance of the provision at issue from a legal
standpoint and the economic significance of preserving this particular
deal.97
Most respondents admitted that their own company's employees
never or rarely read what was on the other side's form beyond the
dickered terms of the deal. Some subjects, however, said that the an
swer sometimes depends on certain factors. More than one in-house
lawyer indicated their belief that if they have taught their business
people anything, it is never to actually sign the other side's form with
out first reading it and consulting the law department.98 A couple of
subjects indicated that someone in their company would read the
terms and conditions on the other side's form where it was a particu
larly large deal that for some reason still did not warrant a fully inte
grated contract.99 Finally, a couple of subjects said that whether the
other side's form was read would depend in part on which employee
received it, with lower-level employees being much less likely to read
the boilerplate than higher-level employees.100

V.

SPECIFIC REFORM PROPOSALS

As alluded to earlier, lawyers and academics have articulated a
number of different reform proposals to clean up the current battle-of
the-forms statute. For purposes of my interviews, I have focused on
three of those proposals. The first two were suggested by prominent
academics and are appealing to me because they are so radically dif
ferent from most of the other proposals which are out there. The third
proposal is a sort of thumbnail sketch of where the Article 2 revision
process seems destined to end up; that proposal has also been greatly

95. See, e.g., Interview No. 3 (transcript at 3) (on file with author); Interview No. 8
{transcript at 5) (on file with author).
96. See Interview No. 4 (transcript at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 12 (tran
script at 4) (on file with author); Interview No. 13 (transcript at page 3) (on file with author);
and Interview No. 24 (transcript at 3) (on file with author).
97. See, e.g., Interview No. 13 (transcript at 3-4) (on file with author); and Interview No.
16 (transcript at 5) (on file with author).
98. See Interview No. 7 (transcript at 4) (on file with author); Interview No. 17 (tran
script at 9) (on file with author); Interview No. 19 (transcript at 7) (on file with author).
99. See Interview No. 12 (transcript at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 18 (tran
script at 4) (on file with author).
100. See Interview No. 22 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author); Interview No. 25
(transcript at 7) (on file with author).
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influenced by a number of similar proposals that have been articulated
by such academics as Professor Murray.
Given the small size of my sample, I would . be hard-pressed to
generalize even about the factual patterns that I found. There are still
additional reasons beyond sample size to question the value of the re
actions from my subjects to the specific reform proposals that follow.
First, there is likely to be a status-quo bias among those in the field.101
Second, there is less reason to think that those practicing in the field
are in a better position than academics to predict the effects of a
change in the law, even if they are clearly in a better position to report
on the facts of their own company's existing practices. Nevertheless, I
asked subjects about these reform proposals to see if perhaps there
were nonobvious factors at work that the proposals had not consid
ered.

1.

The Baird-Weisberg Model

After seeing the Baird-Weisberg proposal, one might accuse these
two academics of going "retro" on us. Essentially, Professors Baird
and Weisberg suggest that we actually would be better off with a re
turn to the common law "mirror image" and "last shot" doctrines.102
While at first glance such a proposal might not sound that interesting,
the arguments that the two authors make for their proposal are clearly
thought-provoking and arguably compelling.
Professors Baird and Weisberg begin by taking issue with most
commentators' aversion to the formalist approach that is represented
by the mirror-image rule. The two authors point out that critics of the
common law approach have probably overestimated the extent to
which that approach would sanction opportunistic behavior.103 The
fear has been that the common law approach would allow parties to
use slight differences in boilerplate terms to back out of contracts
where there truly has been a meeting of the minds. The authors argue
that courts can handle the problem of the reneging party within the
existing framework of the mirror-image rule by construing the "mirror
image" concept either broadly or narrowly, depending on the court's
sense of whether a party is simply using the rule to be opportunistic.104
Professors Baird and Weisberg also anticipate the criticism that the
last-shot doctrine may in practice favor the seller, who tends to fire the
last shot in the typical battle-of-the-forms case. Their response is that

101. On the general tendency to overrate legal risks, see Donald C. Langevoort &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal
Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997).
102. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 9.
103. See id. at 1223.
104. See id. at 1231-37.
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it is not necessarily unfair to have a rule that favors one side or the
other, as long as the rule is clear from the beginning and both parties
know it.105 Under those circumstances, the party that is unhappy with
the default form can simply bargain around the terms that it does not
like.
The key benefit of the common law rule to the battle of the forms,
according to the Baird-Weisberg theory, is that it doesn't force parties
to use default terms such as the U.C.C. gap-fillers that may not be
well-suited to either party's interest. Instead, the mirror-image rule
gives both parties an incentive to craft their forms in ways that reflect
the reality of their industry or the marketplace more generally.106
Professors B aird and Weisberg argue that because at least some
parties will read the forms, the mirror-image rule encourages parties
to draft provisions that advance the mutual interests of buyer and
seller.107 If a party persists in writing one-sided terms on its form, it
will risk losing business since the other side is more likely to read a
form that it knows it might be bound by. The two authors stress that
effectively it only takes a minority of parties reading their forms to en
courage the form drafters not to be unfairly one-sided.103 The problem
with a regime like section 2-207, in which U.C.C. gap-fillers are more
likely to control, is that parties have less of an incentive to read forms
since the terms on those forms probably won't bind them anyway.
Drafting parties, in turn, will have less reason to draft forms with any
thought of the other side's interests in mind.109
The Baird-Weisberg model is premised on two key factual assump
tions about the behavior of parties in battle-of-the-forms scenarios: 1)
That at least some parties will read the other side's forms closely; and
2) That parties will change terms on their forms if less than a majority
of those receiving the forms object to those terms. The interviews that
I conducted suggest that the two authors are probably right on both
counts; nevertheless, their general proposal was not especially popular
with the subjects whom I asked.
Concerning their first assumption, as indicated earlier in this Arti
cle, at least some parties already read the other side's forms for at
least certain kinds of deals.110 And remember, too, that the reading of
forms that already occurs is in a regime in which it is less likely that
the recipient of the form will end up being bound by the form's terms.
Were the mirror-image rule to become the prevailing law, then still

105. See id. at 1249 n.80.
106. See id. at 1223.
107. See id. at 1251-52.
108. See id. at 1253-54.
109. See id. at 1255-56.
110. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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more parties ought to be reading the other side's forms, given the in
creased likelihood that a party would end up being bound by terms on
the other side's form. Several respondents in my interviews indicated
that they believed this would be the case.111
As to the second assumption, I posed that question directly to at
least some of the subjects I interviewed: "Would an objection to a
given term by one or more vendors or purchasers cause you to change
your form as to that term for all vendors or purchasers?" A minority
of those responding said that they would not change their form, but
most who answered the question said that they would likely change
their form if the objection were fairly frequent and the term were not
critically important to their side.112 As an in-house lawyer for a major
food-product manufacturer explained, if a term that was commonly
objected to were not that important to your side, it would be more ef
ficient simply to change it in your form than to have to negotiate it
frequently.113 Some terms, though, this lawyer said, would not be
changed based on frequent objections by the other side because they
are just too important to the company that drafted the form.114
A few of the respondents indicated that they had already changed
their forms to anticipate objections on issues that aren't that signifi
cant to them.115 The new approach, according to an in-house lawyer
for an aircraft manufacturer, is to consider terms that are frequently
objected to which aren't that valuable to the company and just to
change them on the forms in advance so as to save a lot of time.116
As noted earlier, what is most striking about this small group of
large companies is that all of them have the leverage to require a take
it-or-leave-it approach to their forms. In a sense, these three compa
nies are directly testing the Baird-Weisberg hypothesis: the other side
knows in advance that if it wants to deal with the large company, it will
be stuck with the terms on the large company's form; the recipient of
the form thus has a greater incentive to read the terms on the form;
and, in tum, the drafter of the form finds it more efficient to draft
terms that are more balanced from the start than to waste time negoti-

111. See, e.g., Interview No. 19 (transcript at 9) ("I think we would probably have to
start looking at vendors' forms" if a mirror-image regime were in place.) (on file with
author); Interview No. 21 (transcript at 6) (predicting that there would be much more focus
on the agreements in advance in a mirror-image system) (on file with author).
112 See, e.g., Interview No. 17 (transcript at7) ("I think it's fair to say that . . . we would
revisit something if we got lots of flack about it.") (on file with author).
113. See Interview No. 19 (transcript at 5) (on file with author).
114. See id.
115. See Interview No. 8 (transcript at page 2) (on file with author); Interview No. 20
(transcript at page 2) (on file with author); and Interview No. 23 (transcript at page 2) (on
file with author).
116. See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 3) (on file with author).
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ating about terms that are not that important to the large company
that is drafting the form.
Despite the fact that the factual assumptions underlying the Baird
Weisberg proposal were generally supported by the results of my in
terviews, the proposal itself received less than enthusiastic reactions
from the subjects to whom it was posed. Part of it may be due to a
general aversion to the costs of change or an overrating of the risks of
change.117 Part of this may be due to the fact that the respondents
were given a bare-bones sketch of the proposal without the accompa
nying articulation of why the proposal would be an improvement over
what we have now. My own reaction to the proposal, for example,
changed considerably between when I first heard it and when I read
carefully the article that explains its rationale.
All of this is not to say that the Baird-Weisberg proposal did not
have its fans among those with whom I spoke. One respondent liked
the certainty of this approach compared to what we have now in sec
tion 2-207.118 Another subject speculated that whoever's form con
trolled under the Baird-Weisberg approach could not draft its form in
too one-sided a fashion or it would backfire. According to this sub
ject, even if the vendor's form were the last shot, the vendor would
still have an incentive not to overreach. In drafting its form, the ven
dor would need to consider that when the purchaser saw the vendor's
form, the vendor who drafted a one-sided form would risk "screw[ing]
up their future relationship . . . [it] might be wonderful from a legal
standpoint [to make a one-sided form] but it's suicide from a business
standpoint. "119
The objections to the Baird-Weisberg proposal took various forms.
Some subjects suggested that this proposal would likely force the par
ties into negotiations about boilerplate terms that would be time
consuming and ultimately not worth it.120 One respondent opined, "It
would be a more definite world, but from our perspective a more time
consuming and expensive world. "121 Another subject said that this
proposal wouldn't work well for large companies, because you can't sit
down and negotiate every deal, and every vendor is likely to have a
different form.122

117. See generally Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 101.
118. See Interview No. 22 (transcript at 9) (on file with author).
119. Interview No. 17 (transcript at 13) (on file with author).
120. See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 10) (on file with author); Interview No. 10 (tran
script at 9-10) (on file with author); Interview No. 11 (transcript at 5) (on file with author);
Interview No. 18 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author); Interview No. 19 (transcript at 9)
(on file with author).
121. Interview No. 8 (transcript at 10) (on file with author).
122 See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 9-10) (on file with author).
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Another group of respondents believed that the Baird-Weisberg
proposal would probably cause parties to insist that the other side sign
their form, and that ultimately this approach would simply end up
testing which side had the most leverage.123 One subject didn't like the
proposal because he felt it would give too much leverage to whoever's
form would prevail in its entirety; this same subject believed the pro
posal would force lots of negotiations with the end result that a com
pany would use several different forms depending on the leverage of
the other side.124
Although one respondent liked the certainty of the Baird
Weisberg approach, a few other subjects mentioned that they actually
preferred the uncertainty of the current law. The former General
Counsel of a major chemical manufacturer indicated his belief from
practice that the uncertainty of the current battle of the forms actually
helps solve disputes when they arise, because neither side is sure that
they're going to win.125 One of the subjects who is a business person
rather than a lawyer argued that "the confusion [of the current ap
proach] in some ways is almost good because it provides just enough
doubt in the mind of someone that they say, 'Do I really want to go
through this or should I get my focus back on what our core business is
here?' "126
My own view of the Baird-Weisberg proposal is that it would
probably work out better in practice than most of the skeptics from
my pool of subjects believed. Clearly there would be an initial cost of
transition as parties engaged in whatever negotiations and changing of
their forms that they felt was warranted by the new rule. When eve
ryone settled into the new system, my guess is that you would see
forms that were not as one-sided as under the current system. So I
think that the rule would probably yield the benefit of fewer contracts
in which the nonimmediate terms were the often sub-optimal U.C.C.
default terms.
My only question is whether the cost of such a switch in rules
would be worth the benefit. That is a question whose answer requires
further study. My sense from the very limited sample that I was
working with is that the current costs of sub-optimal default terms
generated by the present section 2-207 are not that great. Put another
way, the sub-optimal default terms of the U.C.C. may indeed be out
there now, but they don't seem to matter that much in the vast major
ity of cases, maybe in part because so many firms have already opted

123. See Interview No. 9 (transcript at 11) (on file with author); Interview No. 12 (tran
script at 10) (on file with author); Interview No. 13 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author);
Interview No. 16 (transcript at 7) (on file with author).
124. See Interview No. 12 (transcript at 10) (on file with author).
125. See Interview No. 4 (transcript at 9) (on file with author).
126. Interview No. 11 (transcript at 6) (on file with author).
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out of the battle of the forms anyway. On the other hand, there may
be costs to these default terms within the present system that exist but
are simply not evident to either me or the subjects with whom I spoke.

2.

The Goldberg Model

The approach to the battle of the forms espoused by Professor
Goldberg is fairly straightforward.127 Under the "best shot" rule, as he
calls it, a court faced with a battle-of-the-forms issue would be re
quired to choose whichever of the two forms is fairer, or closer to the
center. That form would then govern the transaction in its entirety.
Just like with final-offer arbitration, after which this approach is mod
eled, each side would arguably have an incentive to draft its form with
the other side's interests in mind.128
The problem \vith both the mirror-image rule and the knockout
rule, according to Professor Goldberg, is that buyers and sellers who
know that their form will prevail might be willing to risk losing busi
ness by making their forms extremely one-sided. This would be the
case if they believe that few parties will read the forms anyway and
that there will be significant benefit in having their form govern with
the majority of the parties that will not bother to read the form.129
In the opinion of those individuals I interviewed, the Goldberg
model fared slightly better than the Baird-Weisberg approach, but not
by much. There were several subjects who thought that the proposal
would indeed achieve its desired objective of causing parties to draft
more evenhandedly from the start. "I think that's a phenomenal idea
because I am a big fan of final offer arbitration," said one lawyer who
represents several companies and credit managers.130 One respondent
liked the fact that in response to this proposal, you could change your
form just once and thereafter would not need to negotiate forms con
stantly.131 Another subject, though, questioned whether a judge could
really compare the relative "fairness" of, say, a very detailed purchase
order with a bare-bones acknowledgment form that hardly contained
any terms.132
The biggest objection to the "best shot" rule was a general discom
fort with the notion of a judge who is not intimately familiar with a
deal having to make an either/or choice between two forms, particu
larly when the dispute is typically focused on a single issue or two.

127. See Goldberg, supra note 5.
128. See id. at 166.
129. See id. at 165.
130. Interview No. 16 (transcript at 8) (on file with author).
131. See Interview No. 7 (transcript at 9-10) (on file with author).
132 See Interview No. 13 (transcript at 8) (on file with author).
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One in-house counsel said, "I personally would never want a j udge de
ciding what was fair in my business."133 Another company lawyer said,
"I'd hate to have some outside party make my deal for me."134 Yet a
third lawyer that worked in-house argued that the proposal "[k]ind of
takes contract law, and throws it out the window, doesn't it?"135
Interestingly, some of the same lawyers who are comfortable with
the uncertainty of current section 2-207 and Article 2's default provi
sions get nervous at the thought of an unknown judge picking one
side's form or the other's. The "best shot" proposal "might cause
somebody a pause for thinking [at the time they are drafting their
form] ," said one in-house lawyer, "but it's a roll of the dice."136 The
either/or nature of the "best shot" rule particularly troubled one com
pany's lawyer: "I'd rather have the [decisionmaker] say, 'Okay, I'll
make a decision and it will be a decision that's fair to both parties,' if
you get to that point."137

3.

Approach of the Article 2 Revision Project

Although final approval of revised Article 2 was postponed this
summer by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, further work on this project is unlikely to affect signifi
cantly the approach that is being taken to revising section 2-207.138
The key goals of that approach seem to be twofold: 1) to de-couple
the issues of formation and terms, so that revised section 2-207 will
deal solely with the terms of a contract rather than with the timing and
existence of its formation; and 2) to simplify the mechanics of section
2-207 so that the question of terms is simply whether the terms on the
two forms match, and if they don't, having the U.C.C. gap-fillers apply
in the absence of clear assent by one side to the other's nonmatching
terms. Under this simplified approach, we would no longer need to
ask: which form was the offer and which was the acceptance; whether
a term was additional or different; whether an additional term consti
tuted a material alteration; or any of the other factual and legal ques
tions that make it difficult to determine under the current section 2207 just when the gap-fillers kick in.

133. Interview No. 8 (transcript at 12) (on file with author).
134. Interview No. 22 (transcript at 9) (on file with author).
135. Interview No. 19 (transcript at 10) (on file with author).
136. Interview No. 10 (transcript at 10) (on file with author).
137. Interview No. 12 (transcript at 10) (on file with author).
138. For example, the Reporter's Note to section 2-207 in the November 1999 Article 2
Revision Draft (on file with the author) says at page 26, "The approach taken here is consis
tent with the approach taken in the July draft, but a number of changes have been made for
the sake of clarity." U.C.C. § 2-207 reporter's note 26 (Reporter's Interim Draft Nov. 1999)
(on file with author).
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Among the group of individuals that I interviewed, the approach
of the Article 2 revision project was the clear favorite. Said one gen
eral counsel: "I think that would be the consensus of most of the peo
ple who have my job. " 139 Most subjects felt that this approach made
the most sense, although one respondent who favored this approach
still wished that somehow the Code drafters could also convey the
gap-fillers more succinctly and in plain English.140 A couple of re
spondents thought that the revision project's approach would end up
being little different than what we have now, given that it is easy
enough in the current regime for everyone to draft his or her forms so
as to create a knockout situation anyway. 141
A few subjects did not prefer the revision project's approach, one
because he thought it would create too much certainty142 and another
because he thought it would create too much uncertainty. 143 Yet a
third subject thought that the apparent certainty created by this pro
posed revision would be illusory, since it is often hard to say when the
terms on two forms agree.144 This same lawyer further argued that a
push toward greater use of the gap-fillers is not necessarily a good
thing given that they are so favorable to the buyer.145

VI. THE FuTURE OF THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
When we think about the future, we think of the "paperless " soci
ety, and to some extent that is already beginning to occur in sales-of
goods transactions. With respect to the battle of the forms, though, I
think it would be a mistake to think that even a paper-less society will
solve the underlying cause for why we have such battles in the first
place. If buyers and sellers would rather not spend the time and effort
negotiating nonimmediate contract terms in a papered society,
whether for reasons of efficiency or psychology or otherwise, then
doing business in an "e-world" may not change things that much.
Clearly there will be cost savings of some kind in a world of electronic
commerce, but most of these savings will not directly reduce the costs
of negotiating about nonimmediate terms.
My interviews suggest that there are at least four developments in
the sales of goods arena that may affect the way that sales transactions

139. Interview No. 9 (transcript at 12) (on file with author).
140. See Interview No. 11 (transcript at 7) (on file with author).
141. See Interview No. 13 (transcript at 9) (on file with author); Interview No. 21 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author).
142 See Interview No. 8 (transcript at 13-14) (on file with author).
143. See Interview No. 16 (transcript at 8) (on file with author}.
144. See Interview No. 17 (transcript at 14) (on file with author).
145. See id.
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are conducted in the future. The first two of these four are technol
ogy-based, but ironically it is the latter two, non-technology develop
ments that may have the greatest effect on the future of the battle of
the forms.
The first development is the increasing use by companies of Elec
tronic Data Interchange ("EDI") in making their purchase orders.
With EDI, a purchasing company sends its purchase order to the ven
dor via electronic mail according to a prearranged format between the
buyer and the seller.146 Most, but not all, of the companies I inter
viewed are now either using or receiving an increasing percentage of
their purchase orders through EDI. Even though the use of EDI re
quires that both buyer and seller sign in advance an EDI Trading
Partner Agreement, most companies do not also use that occasion to
work out the general terms and conditions of the sale beyond the is
sues surrounding the electronic mode of communication. As one law
yer explained, since it is generally the Information Services people
that are setting up the EDI arrangement, "they just want a form that
deals with their issue."147
Some purchasers will try to use the occasion of an EDI arrange
ment to get the vendor to agree to its terms and conditions with each
EDI order: it's the "click here and you agree . . ." syndrome. For
most purchasers, the attempt doesn't succeed. The in-house lawyer
for a large manufacturer explained that his company is seeing much
more EDI both as a purchaser and as a vendor.148 That same lawyer
reported that his company's purchasers try to get the company to sign
on to an EDI Trading Partner Agreement that includes the pur
chaser's terms and conditions, and that his company as purchaser tries
to do the same with its vendors. He conceded that in neither case is
the vendor generally accepting the terms and conditions beyond those
governing the electronic transmission of orders.149
Another electronically based innovation is purchasing not through
an EDI order but instead over the Internet with a personal password
that gets you into the vendor's inventory system tO do direct order
ing.150 Even these particularized "e-business sites" do not typically
solve the battle of the forms, however, because once again the only
real change is with the mode of communication. How to compromise
the nonimmediate terms of the sale remains a separate and thorny is
sue.
146. See generally Electronic Messaging Servs. Task Force, supra note 4.
147. Interview No. 8 (transcript at 9) (on file with author).
148. See Interview No. 17 (transcript at 2-3, 9-11) (on file with author).
149. See id.
150. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 8) (on file with author); Interview No. 14 (tran
script at 5) (on file with author); Interview No. 23 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author).
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The one trend that is likely to have the greatest effect on the battle
of the forms is a market trend, namely the consolidation of major re
tailers into a smaller number of larger entities. A number of the re
spondents indicated that as major retailers become larger and have
more leverage, they are using their leverage in the sales-contracting
process to insist that any vendor who wishes to do business with them
must first sign on to all of the terms of their purchase orders.151 The
lawyer for an office products manufacturer described this trend and
noted that his company is large enough that it can insist on at least ne
gotiating nonimmediate terms and conditions with the retail purchas
ers.152 He wondered, however, whether smaller companies will have
the same ability as his company does in insisting that the big retailers
sit down and compromise on some of their terms.153
The last trend mentioned in the interviews was the effect of a
global market. The in-house lawyer for a consumer appliance manu
facturer said that her company will not allow a battle-of-the-forms
situation to develop whenever it is dealing with a non-U.S. vendor.
The reason, she said, is that her company is much more comfortable
being under the U.C.C. than it would be under the CISG.154

CONCLUSION
Having spent many hours on the phone in interviews that enabled
me to see only the tip of a very large iceberg, I am left not with radical
suggestions for change but instead with a few modest observations.
First, the wheels of commerce seem to have adjusted fairly well to
whatever complications section 2-207 has introduced into the machin
ery. On the whole, the individuals I spoke with don't bother to worry
all that much about the battle-of-the-forms statute, and despite that
(or perhaps because of it) the statute doesn't seem to end up hurting
them much in return.
Second, regarding reform efforts, I finished this project with a
greater comfort level as to the direction that the Article 2 revision
project seems to be headed: a modest simplification, more reliance on
U.C.C. gap-fillers, but ultimately nothing that radical. The sense I got
of where my interview subjects stood on the revision efforts was: if it
ain't broke that much, then don't try to fix it that much. As suggested
earlier, that sentiment may be more an indication of a general aver-

151. See Interview No. 3 (transcript at 7-8) (on file with author); Interview No. 17 (transcript at 9) (on file with author); Interview No. 21 (transcript at 3) (on file with author).
152 See Interview No. 17 (transcript at 9) (on file with author).
153. See id.
154. See Interview No. 10 (transcript at 7) (on file with author).
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sion to change than of a studied conclusion that the current approach
to section 2-207 is truly optimal.
Finally, if there was one common thread that ran through all of the
interviews I conducted, it was a plea not to create laws that get in the
way of how businesses do their thing. As one business person with
whom I spoke put it: "American business has gotten to the point
where the focus on eliminating any sort of bureaucracy is the push . . .
and I think anything that puts a step in between that [should be
avoided]."155

155. Interview No. 11 (transcript at 5) (on file with author).

